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This essay examines three competing interpretations of the
‘Founding Fathers’  that were made in the contested political
climate of the 1980s.  The first is Marc Plattner’s neoclassical
economic interpretation that stresses “Madisonian” principles
of law, property rights, and the danger of majoritarian rule to
justify a minimal rule-based government and free market
capitalism.  The second is Robert Bellah’s communitarian-
democratic interpretation, which appeals to the Founders and
our republican traditions to critique excessive individualism
and advance a more democratic politics governed by the norms
of civic virtue.  The third approach considered is the anti-
Federalist critique of the Founders by Sheldon Wolin, who sees
in the Constitution the beginnings of a system of national
capitalism and state power that undermined localized and
democratic political culture.  Each approach will be assessed
for its contribution toward a more participatory notion of public
life.
In times of upheaval, our search for security often takes us back to
sacred traditions.  The decades of the 1960s and 1970s were periods
of social, economic, and political turmoil in the U.S.  By the 1980s,
a number of responses were put forward to address the “malaise”
of American society.1  Many of these purported to build on basic
American values and traditions.  The appeal of Ronald Reagan
was not just his free market economic program, but his symbolic
image as a representative of America’s past (and his promise of a
return to greatness).
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 This essay examines some competing appeals to the ‘Founding
Fathers’ that were made in the contested political climate of the
1980s.  Historical scholarship has demonstrated repeatedly that
the “facts” of the past never speak for themselves when it comes
to interpreting our traditions and  icons.  Over the last two hundred
years, interpretations of the Founders have reflected the intellectual
currents of the times in which they were written and the political
agendas of their authors (see Kloppenberg 1987).  In the following
discussion, I compare three ideological images of the Founding
philosophy and early American political traditions.  The first is a
neoclassical economic interpretation that stresses the “Madisonian”
principles of law, property rights, and the danger of majoritarian
rule to justify a minimal, rule-based government and free-market
capitalism.  This is exemplified here in the work of Marc Plattner
(1982).  The second approach I consider is a communitarian-
democratic usage which appeals to the Founders and our
“republican” traditions to justify a critique of excessive
individualism in contemporary society, a call for a more
participatory public sphere, and a politics based on norms of ‘civic
virtue.’  This second approach is represented by the work of Robert
Bellah and his colleagues (1985; 1992).  For Bellah, civic virtue
was a normative institutional principle that was central to the
political thought of the Founders; for Plattner, there was no ‘civic
virtue’ other than the equilibrium of competing interests.  A third
approach that will be considered here represents a more radically
democratic, “anti-Federalist” critique of the Founders and the
system they established, which sees in their initiatives the beginning
of a bureaucratic national system that undermined a more localized
and democratic political culture.  Here Sheldon Wolin (1989) will
serve as my example.
 Each of these interpretations will be shown to be partial, reflecting
the political presuppositions of their supporters and the
contradictory aspects of our own political traditions and
institutions.  These contradictions—between capitalism, state
bureaucracy, and democracy—are part of the historical reality of
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the contemporary U.S. that must be acknowledged when discussing
any alternative political formation.
THREE PERSPECTIVES ON OUR CONSTITUTIONAL
TRADITIONS
The three positions profiled here can be said to roughly represent
a “conservative,” “liberal,” and “radical” political stance
respectively, in the contemporary U.S. usage of these terms.  The
neoclassical or classical liberal interpretation of the Federalist
tradition has a long history and is represented in the well-known
work of Louis Hartz (1955) and Richard Hofstadter (1949) among
others.  It was strongly reasserted, with a less critical slant, in the
early 1980s in response to the social and economic crises of the
previous decades, and it was used to condemn the “excesses” of
the interventionist welfare state (Akard 1995).  Proponents of this
view called for a return to “Madisonian” principles of law, markets,
checks-and-balances, and protection of private property as a
defense against the dangers of “majoritarian” democracy (see for
example Wagner 1982).
 There were numerous examples of this position in the political
debates of the early 1980s.  My exemplar here is Marc Plattner, in
particular his essay “American Democracy and the Acquisitive
Spirit” (1982) that was published in an influential collection
sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute titled How
Capitalistic Is the Constitution?2  Plattner rejected the idea that
the Founders held a classical conception of ‘civic virtue’ (as in the
work of Montesquieu, for example) as the basis for social cohesion.
The system they established, he argued, did not require a social or
communitarian interest that transcended the self-interest of
individuals.  Rather, the checks and balances of the federalist
system and the philosophy on which it was established assumed
the “acquisitive spirit” (1982).  For Plattner, a “public sphere” in
the sense of a region of free democratic political discourse existed,
if at all, only among the founding elite, who wisely (in his view)
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constructed an apparatus for balancing private interests and let it
go.  For Plattner (1982: 17-18):
The economical aspects of the framers’ political theory
may be summarized… in the following four points: (1)
Industry and the pursuit of gain should be encouraged. (2)
Superior industry and skill justly merit the greater material
rewards they naturally tend to reap.  (3) The rights of
private property must be secured, both on grounds of
justice and as a necessary condition for promoting industry.
(4) The laws should favor the free and rapid circulation of
property, so that all may have a chance to become rich and
so that distinct and permanent classes of either the very
rich or the very poor are unlikely to form.
       In comparison with the classical republican ideal,3 the
Madisonian version can be said to foster a far-reaching
depoliticization of human society.  Government no longer
need closely supervise the morals, religion, and opinions
of the people, for extraordinary public-spiritedness is
neither demanded nor needed.  The calculating pursuit of
economic advantage and the habits of industry provide a
check on people’s most dangerous and politically
destructive passions.
This neoclassical vision of Madisonian democracy has been
popular on and off throughout our history; for obvious reasons it
was widely disseminated in the early 1980s during the “Reagan
Revolution.”4
 A much different usage of and appeal to the Founders was made
throughout the 1980s by Robert Bellah and his colleagues,
particularly in their best-selling book Habits of the Heart (1985;
see also Bellah et al. 1987; 1991).  Bellah et al. appealed to
America’s political traditions and institutions to justify their call
for a more democratic public sphere and a politics normatively
grounded in a sense of civic morality.  They opposed the excessive
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individualism of contemporary American society produced by
capitalism, bureaucratic organization, managerialism, and other
features of the modern industrial order.  They advocated a more
integrative “social ecology” grounded in our “biblical,”
“republican,” and communitarian traditions.  Their perspective was
a reaction not only to tendencies in modern culture but also to the
prominence in the 1980s of the neoclassical worldview represented
by Plattner.5
Bellah and his co-authors chose to emphasize the democratic side
of the Founders and, unlike Plattner, saw them as proponents of
civic morality or ‘civic virtue.’  While Jefferson was often cited as
the central figure, they claimed that all of the major leaders of the
new republic, in different ways, shared this view.  In spite of the
differences in the views of Adams, Hamilton, Jefferson, Madison,
and others,
All were agreed that a republic needed a government that
was more than an arena within which various interests could
compete, protected by a set of procedural rules.  Republican
government, they insisted, could survive only if animated
by a spirit of virtue and concern for the public good (1985:
253).
From this perspective, Bellah and his colleagues were critical of
the exclusively liberal interpretation of Hartz and others (1985:
36).  The most important source in their analysis was Tocqueville,
whom they used as a starting point in their elaboration of the
integrative mechanisms in early American society; the “means of
association”—law, local democracy, religion, community—that
had been weakened by the late 20th century.
Associations, along with decentralized, local
administration, mediated between the individual and the
centralized state, providing forums in which opinion can
be publicly and intelligently shaped and the subtle habits
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of public initiative and responsibility learned and passed
on.  Associational life, in Tocqueville’s thinking, is the
best bulwark against the condition he feared most: the mass
society of mutually antagonistic individuals, easy prey to
despotism (1985: 38).
In this communitarian passage, we see the ideal of the social
presented as a “bulwark” against the twin dangers of late 20th
century society: big government and capitalism.
 A third interpretation of the Constitutional tradition that is useful
for comparative purposes is the view that the Founders—at least
the prominent Federalists who shaped the new Constitution—were
anti-democratic.  This position parallels the neoclassical viewpoint
in many ways, but it favors participatory democracy, which is seen
to have been undermined in the system established by the Founders.
This perspective is often accompanied by a sympathetic reading
of the anti-Federalist tradition in American political history.  A
contemporary exemplar of this general orientation is Sheldon Wolin
(see especially his 1989 book of essays on the Constitution, The
Presence of the Past).  For Wolin, the Founders overcame an
existing localized, democratic political culture and replaced it with
a more formal national system based on a “new discourse of
organization” (1989: 93) and an Enlightment-based “science of
politics”  (1989: 95-6).  In Wolin’s view, this new system reflected
the Federalist fear of difference, localism, and participation  which
contrasted to the discourse of participation and rebellion that was
emphasized in the Revolutionary period (1989: 88, 92).
The primary tension in Wolin’s critique was that between
democracy and an increasingly bureaucratic order.  Not
surprisingly, Alexander Hamilton and his centralized system was
singled out for special criticism, but all of the Federalists were
held culpable.  Even Jefferson was at least complicit, if not a central
shaper of the new system.  For Wolin, the “Tocquevillian”
institutions stressed by Bellah represent the first system of localized
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practices and associations in early America.  Although these
persisted in the 1830s, they were already being threatened by
bureaucratic political development and capitalist economic
development fostered by the Constitutional system by the time
Tocqueville made his famous visit.  In Wolin’s view, Bellah’s
“managerial” type6 and administrative logic were already inherent
in the system of the Founders, and eventually this logic undermined
the localized public spheres that were the real bases for civic virtue.
ASSESSING THREE DIVERGENT VIEWS OF THE
FOUNDERS
What are we to make of these three quite different interpretations
of the Founding Fathers and the Constitution?   Each is obviously
simplified and one-sided.  In many ways Plattner’s characterization
of the philosophy and system of the Founders is the closest to the
dominant academic view, at least for the Madisonian Federalists
(Jefferson and the “Jeffersonian” tradition is a more complex case).7
However, he distorts their 18th century views in his extensions of
the Federalist protection of liberty and property into a complete
defense of free-market capitalism and the “virtues” of self-interest.
Like most of the neoclassical “Madisonians” of the Reagan era,
he is consistent in his opposition to “excessive” democracy.  The
disruptive or problematic effects of capitalism are ignored (which
distinguishes Plattner’s position from the others).  The problems
of state bureaucracy and democracy—especially as they threaten
the market system and individual liberty—are emphasized.  The
solution to the social upheavals that America had experienced in
the 1960s and 1970s was to return to law, the constitution, and the
market.  At the end of his 1982 essay, Plattner does mention
favorably the “Tocquevillian” factors of religion, local government,
civic association, and so on.  But he immediately qualifies this by
stating (1982: 20) that
Tocqueville constantly stresses … the need to adapt these
supports to the worldly and commercial spirit of a liberal
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capitalist society.  For he perceived that self-interest—
“rightly understood”—was the only reliable basis for
political freedom in the modern world.
This reading of Tocqueville contrasts greatly with that of Bellah
et al., but it squares with Plattner’s general interpretation of our
political history and fundamental institutions (for a similar reading
of Tocqueville see Diggins 1985: 628; 636-37).
The selective portrayal of the Founding philosophy by Bellah and
his colleagues takes it in the opposite direction.  Unlike either
Plattner or Wolin, Bellah downplays the contradictions between
capitalism and democracy that were clearly central to the Federalist
project (expressed famously in Madison’s Federalist Paper No.
10).  The authors of Habits of the Heart certainly recognize this
tension, but they do not take the logic to its conclusion in analyzing
the possibilities for democracy in contemporary society.   Following
the “Jeffersonian” tradition in political discourse, they favor
localized political communities but are ambiguously attracted to
the Constitutional tradition.  In contrast to Wolin, they do not seem
to grasp the depth to which administrative logic and economic
development undermine the basis for “Tocquevillian” institutions.
They do discuss how industrialization and the rise of the modern
corporation led to the decline of the economic and social life of
the town (e.g. 1985: 42).  But again, they fail to draw the obvious
lessons for their own political conclusions.  To frame it in terms of
the sociological classics, Bellah and his co-authors posit a
“Durkheimian” liberalism and general understanding of modernity,8
versus a “Weberian” or “Marxian” analysis of power, domination,
class, and economic development.  Like Durkheim, their political
solutions are above all moral and intellectual (or “cultural” in a
broad sense).  While this dimension is certainly needed if our goal
is to create a new public sphere of civic discourse, their analysis
tends to remain at this level.  There is a fuzziness in their depiction
of the systemic political and economic obstacles to a more
communitarian politics today.9  While both Plattner and Wolin are
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more one-sided in their interpretations, they are each in their own
way clearer about the contradictions between capitalism and
democracy.
The primary problem with Wolin’s position is his failure to deal
with the problems of participatory democracy.  His hard-nosed
critique of the Federalist tradition contrasts greatly with his
romantic assumptions about a localized democratic politics.  This
can be compared to both Plattner and Bellah.  Plattner follows the
lead of the Federalists themselves, who sought to control the
“tyranny of the majority” with a political structure of fragmentation,
checks and balances, and rational law.  Wolin certainly recognizes
this aspect of the Federalist project, but he does not take seriously
enough the difficulties of decentralized democracy that led to such
a plan.  Bellah is less open to this type of charge.  While advocating
a more democratic politics, he envisions it as integrated through
networks of association and guided by the norms of a new civic
morality.
Each of these political theorists makes observations on the social
and political movements of the 1960s, which provides an interesting
point for comparison.  For Plattner, the 1960s are best forgotten.
It was an era of rampant “majoritarianism” and excessive
democracy, which led to increasing demands on the state for
interventionist and redistributive policies.  This, in turn, generated
the economic problems of the 1970s that were only overcome by
the restoration of market discipline (1982:19-20).   Wolin takes
the opposite perspective.  For him the 1960s represented a brief
spark of citizen mobilization for a more authentic democratic
politics.  The social movements of the period attempted to create a
more democratic public sphere, grounded in a new moral sensibility
by which existing systems of domination and material self-interest
were challenged (e.g. 1989: 99).  Both Plattner and Wolin, from
their opposite vantage points, see these as fundamental conflicts
between two contrasting visions of society.
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Bellah and his colleagues are mainly supportive of the 1960s social
movements as well.  They point to the civil rights movement as a
prime example of the type of civic activism they are advocating.
They also have generally positive comments about
environmentalism, the women’s rights movement, and other social
movements of the period.  But again, in some places they exhibit
the fuzziness of their communitarian aspirations by downplaying
structural conflicts of interest.  For example, in their quest to ground
their own politics in American political traditions, they pay
insufficient attention to the main theme of this paper: that
competing groups with different and even contradictory agendas
claim to be upholding these traditions.  This multiple usage of the
language of our past suggests underlying conflicts of interest that
must be uncovered and analyzed if we are to understand the barriers
to a more inclusive politics.
CONCLUSION: TOWARD A MORE DEMOCRATIC PUBLIC
SPHERE?
Among the three perspectives profiled here, Bellah and his co-
authors provide us with the most extensive blueprint for a more
adequate system of political participation and civic discourse.  Their
work is charged with moral passion and humanity.  Unfortunately,
they do not provide us with an adequate analysis of the obstacles
to a more democratic politics in contemporary society.  They cite
Habermas and are influenced by his conception of a public sphere
of relatively undistorted communication and democratic political
participation.10  However, they do not provide us with enough
information about what Habermas calls the “system” level—
systems of political power and economic exchange—that have
come to “colonize” the “lifeworld” in modern societies like our
own (Habermas 1987).11
As stated at the beginning of this essay, each of the above
interpretations is partial and incomplete.  That such contradictory
usages of our past political traditions can exist together is in part a
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reflection of the contradictory elements of American political life.
Over the last 20 years, Plattner’s neoclassical economic viewpoint
has dominated public discourse in the U.S.  This is in part what
Bellah and his colleagues were reacting to.  As they and Wolin
each point out, there are institutional traditions in America that
can be drawn on to inspire a more democratic politics and a more
associative conception of civic virtue and civil society.  However,
as Plattner and Wolin recognize from opposite ends of the political
spectrum, in the U.S. capitalism, the state, and democracy are often
at odds.
It is not good form introduce a new topic in a conclusion.  But I
would like to close by noting another work from the same period
that grapples with similar issues.  Democracy and Capitalism
(1982), by Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, integrates these
three competing perspectives in an interesting way while also
advocating an enhanced sphere of authentic public discourse and
participatory democracy.  They take seriously each level of relevant
analysis and their corresponding ideological debates—capitalism
and neoclassical economics; bureaucracy and the analysis of
bureaucratic power; and liberal democracy and classical liberal
political philosophy.  Drawing on the emancipatory side of the
liberal tradition that emphasizes political participation and citizen
rights, they examine the prerequisites for a more representative
political process.  However, I cite this work because it does not
impose either a false “synthesis” or a one-sided solution, but rather
stresses the contradictory and problematic relationship between
capitalism, bureaucracy, and democracy in contemporary society.
Recognition of this historical reality is the necessary starting point
for any realistic discussion of political alternatives.
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NOTES
1 This is a reference to a speech given by President Carter in 1979 at
the height of this turmoil marked by a major energy crisis, the Iranian
Revolution, Communist insurgence in Central America, rapid inflation,
and the stagnation of the economy.  Under these conditions, Carter’s
acknowledgement of a “crisis in confidence” in America, his realistic
assessment of “limits,” and his call for sacrifice did not play well against
the vision of a triumphant return to American greatness that would be
championed by Ronald Reagan.
2 This is a very useful collection of a variety of different perspectives
on the Consitituion.  Contributors besides Plattner include Edward S.
Greenberg, Forrest McDonald, Walter Dean Burnham, Bernard H. Siegan,
Robert Lekachman, and Stephen Miller.
3 “Classical republicanism” has been defined in various ways.
Kloppenberg (1987:14) notes its ambiguous usage, but says this:
“Classical republicans called for independent citizens to protect fragile
civic virtue against the threat of corruption represented by the extension
of executive power. Their ideal of a community, in which individuals
define their interests in terms of the common good, figured prominently
in the political literature produced in America…”  Shalhope (1982: 334-
35) provides this definition: “Preserving a republican polity meant
protecting liberty from the ceaseless aggression of power.  In addition,
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Americans believed that what made republics great or ultimately
destroyed them was not the force of arms but the character and spirit of
the people.  Public virtue, as the essential prerequisite for good
government, was all-important….Thus republicanism meant maintaining
public and private virtue, internal unity, social solidarity, and vigilance
against the corruptions of power.”  This tradition will play a much greater
role in the perspective of Bellah and his colleagues.  For useful overviews
of the debates over this concept and its application to U.S. history see
Appleby (1986); Rogers (1992).
4 For a more nuanced view of the liberal tradition, see Kloppenberg
(1987); see also Appleby (1976). For a reassertion of the neoclassical
interpretation against appeals to ‘republican virtue’—and also against
neo-Marxian assertions of a communitarian, anti-liberal working class
consciousness in the U.S.—see Diggins (1985).
5 In this regard the competing interpretations of Plattner and Bellah
mirror the long-running debate among historians and political theorists
over “liberal” vs. “republican” readings of the Founders.  See
Kloppenberg (1987) for an excellent overview.
6 Bellah et al. develop several ideal character types that are used to
mark the historical development of American society and culture; e.g.
the Independent Citizen, the Entrepreneur, the Manager, and the Therapist
(1985: chapter two).  The ‘Manager’ developed with the emergence of
the modern corporation and the separation of public and private life.
“The essence of the manager’s task is to organize the human and non-
human resources available to the organization that employs him so as to
improve its position in the marketplace.  His role is to persuade, inspire,
manipulate, cajole, and intimidate those he manages so that his
organization measures up to criteria of effectiveness shaped ultimately
by the market but specifically by the expectations of those in control of
his organization—finally, its owners” (1985: 45).  For Wolin, this logic
is inherent in the system constructed by the Federalists.
7 On the various interpretations of Jefferson, see Kloppenberg (1987);
Banning (1986); Ashworth (1984).
8 While Tocqueville is the theoretical champion cited by Bellah et
al. the sociological inspiration is clearly Durkheim.
9 There are striking similarities between the type of democratic public
sphere advocated by Bellah and the concept of ‘publics’ that C. Wright
Mills advocates against the increasing domination of “mass society” in
The Power Elite (1956: chapter 10).  Why is Mills not cited?  Perhaps
because his “left-Weberian” analysis of economic and organizational
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power as an obstacle to democracy does not quite square with the
“Durkheimian” moral/cultural starting point favored by Bellah and his
colleagues.
10 See Habermas (1989).  For a very useful analysis of Habermas’
concept of the public sphere see the contributions in Calhoun (1996).
11 This was a conscious decision on the authors’ part, and their
rationale seems to verify my earlier assessment: “As our work progressed,
we developed our ideas with constant reference to the writings of Jurgen
Habermas, whose notion of economic and political “systems” invading
and colonizing the “life-world” significantly influenced us.  In the end
we decided not to use his terminology, which seemed to imply a sharper
dichotomy between systems and life-world than we intended.  In
particular, Habermas’s language made it difficult for us to argue for the
institutional humanization of the economy and the administrative state,
even though we know he shares our hope for that possibility” (1991:
291).  While this may be true, Habermas’s language might have made it
easier to depict the obstacles to this “humanization.”
